 Interest Groups, Transfer Seeking and Democratization: Competition for the Benefits of Governmental Power May Explain African Political InstabilityAmerican Journal of Economics and Sociology, 1989, vol. 48, issue 3, 339-349 Abstract: Abstract. The effect of permanent interest group transfer‐seeking behavior on the degree of democratization is examined, Each permanent interest group is viewed as attempting to maximize its share of wealth transfers through the political process. To maximize the share of transfers, each group undertakes competitive strategies to control the instruments of transfers. Such competition is more intense the larger the number of permanent interest groups in a given country, and the higher the likelihood that the competition would involve non‐democratic means to achieve and maintain control of the political machinery in those countries. It is predicted that the more intense the competition for transfers, which is a direct function of the number of permanent interest groups in any given country, the less democratic the system of government in that country is likely to be. This prediction is supported empirically using cross‐sectional data for 65 countries. Date: 1989 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:48:y:1989:i:3:p:339-349 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article American Journal of Economics and Sociology is currently edited by Laurence S. Moss More articles in American Journal of Economics and Sociology from Wiley Blackwell |
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