South Korean Labor Market Discrimination Against Women: Estimating Its Cost

Elizabeth Monk‐Turner and Charlie G. Turner

American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 1994, vol. 53, issue 4, 433-442

Abstract: Abstract. South Korean chaebols (large family owned firms) have extensive government ties which provide them with favorable treatment. In turn, the government obtains support from the chaebols. The chaebols have gained economic or excess profits through exploiting monopolistic power in the domestic South Korean product market and through exploiting monopsonistic power in the domestic factor market. How a monopsonistic firm obtains excess profits is illustrated and related to the behavior of the chaebols as a whole. Major focus is on the labor market. The chaebols have discretionary power over how to exploit their monopsonistic position. The status of women in the South Korean work force in light of this discretionary power is considered. An estimate of the income loss involved is made.

Date: 1994
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