Cooperation Within the Entity of the Firm

Joan Nix

American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 1994, vol. 53, issue 4, 443-453

Abstract: Abstract. When the presence of unexploited/ree riding opportunities within organizations is considered a sign of cooperation among employees, a repeated prisoner's dilemma game may be used as an explanation. In this paper, arguments against sole reliance on the repeated prisoner's dilemma game for explaining cooperation within the firm are set forth. Some overlooked reasons for explaining cooperation are offered.

Date: 1994
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-7150.1994.tb02617.x

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