The Long and Bumpy Road to Glass‐Steagall Reform: A Historical and Evolutionary Analysis of Banking Legislation

Jill M. Hendrickson

American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 2001, vol. 60, issue 4, 849-879

Abstract: This paper focuses on understanding the role of interest groups and markets in influencing regulatory change. To that end, it first identifies the interest groups surrounding the creation of legislation that separated commercial and investment banking in the 1930s and then identifies the interest groups involved in the more recent attempts to repeal the separation. Careful attention is also given to developments in the private market that affect the legislative process. This then becomes the case study for understanding how interest groups and market developments are able to influence regulatory policy. This particular case study finds that existing orthodox economic and political science literature gives too much credit to interest groups and not enough credit to private market developments when analyzing policy development and reform.

Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1536-7150.00126

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:60:y:2001:i:4:p:849-879

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0002-9246

Access Statistics for this article

American Journal of Economics and Sociology is currently edited by Laurence S. Moss

More articles in American Journal of Economics and Sociology from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().