The Agency Relationship in Churches: An Empirical Analysis

Charles Zech

American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 2007, vol. 66, issue 4, 727-746

Abstract: Abstract. The agency relationship has been observed in a variety of settings. Churches, like other organizations, are plagued with the typical agency problems of moral hazard, observability, goal displacement, and risk aversion. How do churches cope with these issues in dealing with their most critical resource, clergy? This study analyzes the agency relationship between churches and their clergy. Using data from nine denominations, this study finds strong evidence that pastor compensation is not tied directly to performance, but rather indirectly through promotion tournaments. Successful pastors are rewarded by being called to larger, presumably wealthier and more prestigious, congregations. Since it is so difficult to observe and measure a pastor's performance in specific activities, churches differentiate good pastors from mediocre ones by considering their total performance, rather than any specific activities.

Date: 2007
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