National Emissions Standards, Pollution Havens, and Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Abhinav Alakshendra and
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 2014, vol. 73, issue 2, 353-368
The present study shows that the availability of “pollution havens” can negate the effect of national legislation that tightens industrial greenhouse gas emission standards. In the perverse case, a unilateral tightening of said standards in Country A (a country with relatively stringent industrial emission standards) causes a representative multinational firm to emit more units of greenhouse gas in its global production. The article highlights the potential perils of unilateral action on environmental issues that are global in nature.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:73:y:2014:i:2:p:353-368
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0002-9246
Access Statistics for this article
American Journal of Economics and Sociology is currently edited by Laurence S. Moss
More articles in American Journal of Economics and Sociology from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().