How to deter earnings manipulation in Chinese banks? A study from the combined effects of corporate governance, enterprise resources, and supervisory mechanisms

Shuangjin Wang, Lili Dang, John Downs and Maggie Foley

American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 2024, vol. 83, issue 4, 689-707

Abstract: The study proposes methods for deterring earnings manipulation in Chinese commercial banks, recognizing it as an ongoing problem with the potential to destabilize investors and financial markets. The increasing integration of the global financial system has heightened the importance of addressing this issue, given the systemic risk posed by large individual financial institutions. Utilizing the Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis method (fsQCA) on 139 Chinese commercial banks in 2021, the paper explores factors influencing banks' earnings manipulation behavior. The study reveals several key findings: (1) Factors associated with reducing the likelihood of earnings manipulation in commercial banks are diverse and multifaceted. (2) Multiple paths exist to achieve earnings manipulation, categorized into Resource‐guided, Corporate Governance, Resource and Supervisory Mechanism, Supervisory Mechanism, and Corporate Governance as the main mechanism. Among these, the Supervisory Mechanism exhibits the highest consistency. (3) Hiring “Big Four” accounting firms as auditors emerges as a significant deterrent against earnings manipulation in commercial banks. (4) Banks with powerful major shareholders affiliated with the government or ample resources are effective in deterring earnings manipulation. These two factors are complementary, while a bank's growth prospects and industrial competition serve as substitute factors.

Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:83:y:2024:i:4:p:689-707

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