WELFARE IN THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN EXPORT TAXES UNDER BERTRAND DUOPOLY
Roger Clarke and
Bulletin of Economic Research, 2008, vol. 60, issue 2, 183-189
In the Eaton and GrossmanQuarterly Journal of Economics, 101 (1986), pp. 383–406 model of export taxes under Bertrand duopoly, it is shown that welfare in the Nash equilibrium in export taxes is always higher than welfare under free trade for both countries.
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Working Paper: Welfare in the Nash Equilibrium in Export Taxes under Bertrand Duopoly (2006)
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