Welfare in the Nash Equilibrium in Export Taxes under Bertrand Duopoly
Roger Clarke and
No E2006/16, Cardiff Economics Working Papers from Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section
In the Eaton and Grossman (1986) model of export taxes under Bertrand duopoly, it is shown that welfare in the Nash equilibrium in export taxes is always higher than welfare under free trade for both countries.
Keywords: Trade Policy; Imperfect Competition; Oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-mic
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Published in Bulletin of Economic Research , Vol. 60, Issue 2, pp. 183-189.
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Journal Article: WELFARE IN THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN EXPORT TAXES UNDER BERTRAND DUOPOLY (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2006/16
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