MORAL HAZARD, RISK AVERSION AND EFFICIENCY

Oliver Gürtler

Bulletin of Economic Research, 2014, vol. 66, issue S1, S104-S109

Abstract: type="main">

This note revisits the classic moral-hazard model, but assumes that the output distribution has moving support and punishments are limited. The results show that the principal can implement an efficient solution if the agent is sufficiently risk averse.

Date: 2014
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