Perspective on Local Governance Reform in China
Mingxing Liu,
Binwen Song and
Ran Tao
China & World Economy, 2006, vol. 14, issue 2, 16-31
Abstract:
This paper is an attempt to present an analysis of China's decentralization and local governance practices, the dilemmas rooted in the current institution. We argue that the misbehavior of local government officials is endogenous to China's central‐local structure and that competition among localities has become distorted and constrained by various policy burdens and development mandates imposed from above. The information asymmetry for the enforcement cost of mandates that exists between central and local governments not only leads to difficulties and distortions in local performance evaluations, but also creates opportunities for local bureaucracy expansion and rent‐seeking. Enhancing fiscal transfers, or strengthening political restraint, although necessary, would be far from enough to solve the local governance problems. The ultimate solution entails an in‐depth deregulation reform on factor mobility and a furthest eradication of policy mandates for the local government. Edited by Xinyu Fan
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-124X.2006.00012.x
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:chinae:v:14:y:2006:i:2:p:16-31
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1671-2234
Access Statistics for this article
China & World Economy is currently edited by Yongding Yu
More articles in China & World Economy from Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().