 From State to State: Quasi‐privatization and Firm PerformanceKun Wang China & World Economy, 2009, vol. 17, issue 5, 52-68 Abstract: This paper uses a sample of Chinese listed companies whose controlling shareholders have changed from government agencies to state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), to examine whether reducing government intervention while maintaining government's ultimate control could improve firm performance. The results show that the overall performance of these firms improves after the transfer of their controlling shareholders, due to improvements in both operating and non‐operating performance. When we separate all samples into solely SOEs and other SOEs based on the controlling shareholder, we find that operating performance improved significantly in the solely SOE group, whereas non‐operating performance improved significantly in the SOE group. In addition, we identify sources of performance improvement from two perspectives: corporate governance and related party transactions. The results imply that the Chinese Government should continue to decentralize control and, at the same time, continue to monitor firm operating efficiency. Date: 2009 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:chinae:v:17:y:2009:i:5:p:52-68 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article China & World Economy is currently edited by Yongding Yu More articles in China & World Economy from Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Contact information at EDIRC. |
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