RISK TAKING IN CONTESTS AND THE ROLE OF CARROTS AND STICKS

Scott Gilpatric

Economic Inquiry, 2009, vol. 47, issue 2, 266-277

Abstract: We study contests in which contestants choose both work effort and the variance of output (risk). Winner‐take‐all contests generate incentives for contestants to engage in costly risk taking, which is inefficient if the contest organizer values the aggregate output of all contestants. The addition of a penalty for ranking last (retaining a prize for ranking first) enables the organizer to independently control contestants’ incentives to exert productive effort and to increase output variance. In this way, the organizer can eliminate risk‐seeking behavior in settings where it is wasteful, but also control risk seeking when it is desirable, such as in research tournaments. (JEL J33, C72)

Date: 2009
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