TACIT COLLUSION IN AUCTIONS AND CONDITIONS FOR ITS FACILITATION AND PREVENTION: EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN LABORATORY EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS

Jin Li and Charles Plott

Economic Inquiry, 2009, vol. 47, issue 3, 425-448

Abstract: The paper studies bidder behavior in simultaneous, continuous, ascending price auctions. We design and implement a “collusion incubator” environment based on a type of public, symmetrically “folded” and “item‐aligned” preferences. Tacit collusion develops quickly and reliably within the environment. Once tacit collusion developed, it proved remarkably robust to institutional changes that weakened it as an equilibrium of a game‐theoretic model. The only successful remedy was a non‐public change in the preference of participants that destroyed the symmetrically, “folded” and “item aligned” patterns of preferences, creating head‐to‐head competition between two agents reminiscent of the concept of a “maverick.”(JEL L50, L94, D43)

Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00152.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Tacit collusion in auctions and conditions for its facilitation and prevention: Equilibrium selection in laboratory experimental markets (2005)
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