Tacit collusion in auctions and conditions for its facilitation and prevention: Equilibrium selection in laboratory experimental markets

Jin Li and Charles Plott

No 1223, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Keywords: tacit collusion; information; auctions; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2005-11
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/sswp1223.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/sswp1223.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/sswp1223.pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: TACIT COLLUSION IN AUCTIONS AND CONDITIONS FOR ITS FACILITATION AND PREVENTION: EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN LABORATORY EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:clt:sswopa:1223

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125
sswp@hss.caltech.edu

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Victoria Mason (sswp@hss.caltech.edu).