ON THE DESIRABILITY OF TAX COORDINATION WHEN COUNTRIES COMPETE IN TAXES AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Patrice Pieretti and
Benteng Zou ()
Economic Inquiry, 2017, vol. 55, issue 2, 682-694
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Working Paper: On the desirability of tax coordination when countries compete in taxes and infrastructure (2014)
Working Paper: On the desirability of tax coordination when countries compete in taxes and infrastructures (2013)
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