On the desirability of tax coordination when countries compete in taxes and infrastructure

Yutao Han, Patrice Pieretti and Benteng Zou
Additional contact information
Yutao Han: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 476, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: In our paper, we demonstrate that when countries compete in taxes and infrastructure, coordination through a uniform tax rate or a minimum rate does not necessarily create the welfare effects observed under pure tax competition. The divergence is even worse when the competing jurisdictions differ in institutional quality. If tax revenues are used to gauge the desirability of coordination, our model demonstrates that imposing a uniform tax rate is Pareto-inferior to the non-cooperative equilibrium when countries compete in taxes and infrastructure. This result is completely reversed under pure tax competition if the countries are sufficiently similar in size. If a minimum tax rate is set within the range of those resulting from the non-cooperative equilibrium, the low tax country will never be better off. Finally, the paper demonstrates that the potential social welfare gains from tax harmonization crucially depend on the degree of heterogeneity among the competing countries.

Keywords: socialwelfare; Tax competition; infrastructure; tax revenue; tax coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30
Date: 2014-04-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-tre
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2674047/2902034 First Version, 2013 (application/x-download)

Related works:
Journal Article: ON THE DESIRABILITY OF TAX COORDINATION WHEN COUNTRIES COMPETE IN TAXES AND INFRASTRUCTURE (2017)
Working Paper: On the desirability of tax coordination when countries compete in taxes and infrastructures (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:476

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bettina Weingarten ().