AUDIT STATE DEPENDENT TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
James Alm (),
James Cox () and
Vjollca Sadiraj ()
Economic Inquiry, 2020, vol. 58, issue 2, 819-833
We develop and analyze a dynamic model of individual taxpayer compliance choice that predicts “audit state dependent taxpayer compliance,” by distinguishing between forward‐looking versus myopic versus naïve behavior. We then test experimentally the audit state dependent model by reporting the results from the first tax compliance experiment run in Colombia. We find that subjects' compliance rates increase with greater enforcement. We also find more novel results: fine rates should be increased after an audit, and “nudging” myopic individuals toward reporting a constant rather than a fluctuating proportion of income would benefit both the taxpayer and the tax authority.(JEL H26, C91)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Audit State Dependent Taxpayer Compliance: Theory and Evidence from Colombia (2019)
Working Paper: AUDIT STATE DEPENDENT TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:58:y:2020:i:2:p:819-833
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0095-2583
Access Statistics for this article
Economic Inquiry is currently edited by Preston McAfee
More articles in Economic Inquiry from Western Economic Association International Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().