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Claudia Cerrone ()

Economic Inquiry, 2021, vol. 59, issue 1, 315-328

Abstract: This paper develops a strategic model of procrastination in which present‐biased agents prefer to perform an onerous task with someone else. This turns their decision of when to perform the task into a procrastination game—a dynamic coordination game between present‐biased players. The model characterizes the conditions under which interaction mitigates or exacerbates procrastination. A procrastinator matched with a worse procrastinator may perform her task earlier than she otherwise would: she wants to avoid the increased temptation that her peer's company would generate. Procrastinators can thus use bad company as a commitment device to mitigate their self‐control problem. (JEL C72, C73, D03, D91)

Date: 2021
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Working Paper: Doing it when others do: a strategic model of procrastination (2016) Downloads
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