Doing it when others do: a strategic model of procrastination

Claudia Cerrone

No 2016_10, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: This paper develops a strategic model of procrastination in which present-biased agents prefer to do an onerous task in the company of someone else. This turns their decision of when to do the task into a procrastination game – a dynamic coordination game between present-biased players. The model characterises the conditions under which interaction mitigates or exacerbates procrastination. Surprisingly, a procrastinator matched with a worse procrastinator may do her task earlier than she otherwise would: she wants to avoid the increased temptation that her peer's company would generate. Procrastinators can thus use bad company as a commitment device to mitigate their self-control problem. Principals can reduce procrastination by matching procrastinators with each other, but the efficient matching may not be stable.

JEL-codes: C72 C73 D03 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: DOING IT WHEN OTHERS DO: A STRATEGIC MODEL OF PROCRASTINATION (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2016_10

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