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Optimal Law Enforcement and Imperfect Information when Wealth Varies among Individuals

Nuno Garoupa

Economica, 1998, vol. 65, issue 260, 479-490

Abstract: There is a belief that imperfect information about the probability of punishment and severity of punishment weakens deterrence. We assess this belief concerning two specific implications: non‐optimal deterrence and severity of punishment. We conclude that it may well be the case that the introduction of imperfect information entails a more severe punishment when wealth varies among individuals.

Date: 1998
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