Optimal Law Enforcement and Imperfect Information when Wealth Varies among Individuals
Nuno Garoupa
Economica, 1998, vol. 65, issue 260, 479-490
Abstract:
There is a belief that imperfect information about the probability of punishment and severity of punishment weakens deterrence. We assess this belief concerning two specific implications: non‐optimal deterrence and severity of punishment. We conclude that it may well be the case that the introduction of imperfect information entails a more severe punishment when wealth varies among individuals.
Date: 1998
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0335.00142
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:econom:v:65:y:1998:i:260:p:479-490
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