Altruism, Voluntary Contributions and Neutrality: The Case of Environmental Quality

Pierre‐André Jouvet, Philippe Michel and Pierre Pestieau

Economica, 2000, vol. 67, issue 268, 465-475

Abstract: This paper develops an intertemporal model wherein production generates pollution, which is viewed by consumers as a public bad. There are two types of consumer: those who are altruistic and leave bequests to their children, and those who are pure life‐cyclers. Both types voluntarily contribute to the quality of environment through environmental groups. It appears that, if bequests by altruists and voluntary contributions by all are positive, redistribution is neutral—which does not mean that pollution abatement and capital accumulation are optimal. To achieve optimality, one needs a tax on inheritance and a differential subsidy on all consumer contributions.

Date: 2000
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0335.00220

Related works:
Working Paper: Altruism, voluntary contributions and neutrality: the case of environmental quality (2000)
Working Paper: Altruism, voluntary contributions and neutrality. The case of environmental quality (1996)
Working Paper: Altruism, Voluntary Contributions and Neutrality. The Case of Environmental Quality (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:econom:v:67:y:2000:i:268:p:465-475

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