Altruism, voluntary contributions and neutrality. The case of environmental quality

Pierre-André Jouvet, Philippe Michel and Pierre Pestieau

No 1996067, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This paper develops an intertemporal model wherein production generates pollution, which is viewed by consumers as a public bad. There are two types of consumer: those who are altruistic and leave bequests to their children, and those who are pure life-cyclers. Both types voluntarily contribute to the quality of environment through environmental groups. It appears that, if bequests by altruists and voluntary contributions by all are positive, redistribution is neutral--which does not mean that pollution abatement and capital accumulation are optimal. To achieve optimality, one needs a tax on inheritance and a differential subsidy on all consumer contributions.

Date: 1996-12-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp1996.html (text/html)

Related works:
Journal Article: Altruism, Voluntary Contributions and Neutrality: The Case of Environmental Quality (2000)
Working Paper: Altruism, voluntary contributions and neutrality: the case of environmental quality (2000)
Working Paper: Altruism, Voluntary Contributions and Neutrality. The Case of Environmental Quality (1996)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1996067

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().