Does Social Pressure Hinder Entrepreneurship in Africa? The Forced Mutual Help Hypothesis

Philippe Alby, Emmanuelle Auriol and Pierre Nguimkeu

Economica, 2020, vol. 87, issue 346, 299-327

Abstract: In the absence of a public safety net, wealthy Africans have the social obligation to share their resources with their needy relatives in the form of cash transfers and inefficient family hiring. We develop a model of entrepreneurial choice that accounts for this social redistributive constraint. We derive predictions regarding employment choices, productivity, and profitability of firms run by entrepreneurs of African versus non‐African origin. Everything else equal, local firms are overstaffed and less productive than firms owned by non‐locals, which discourages local entrepreneurship. Using data from the manufacturing sector, we illustrate the theory by structurally estimating the proportion of missing African entrepreneurs. Our estimates, which are suggestive due to the data limitation, vary between 8% and 12.6% of the formal sector workforce. Implications for the role of social protection are discussed.

Date: 2020
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https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12330

Related works:
Working Paper: Does Social Pressure Hinder Entrepreneurship in Africa? The Forced Mutual Help Hypothesis (2020)
Working Paper: Does Social Pressure Hinder Entrepreneurship in Africa? The Forced Mutual Help Hypothesis (2018)
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