Campaign Contributions and the Desirability of Full Disclosure Laws

Randolph Sloof

Economics and Politics, 1999, vol. 11, issue 1, 83-107

Abstract: In a signaling game model of costly political campaigning in which a candidate is dependent on a donor for campaign funds it is verified whether the electorate may benefit from campaign contributions being directly observed. By purely focusing on the informational role of campaign contributions the model seems somewhat biased against the potential benefits of direct observation. Still, the conclusion can be drawn that directly observable contributions allow for more information being revealed in equilibrium. Using this result, from an informational perspective a case can be built for the desirability of full disclosure laws.

Date: 1999
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