Political fragmentation, competition, and investment decisions: the medieval grinding industry in Ponthieu, France, 1150–1250
Karine van der Beek ()
Economic History Review, 2010, vol. 63, issue 3, 664-687
This article explores the effects of political structure on rulers' monopolistic gains and investment decisions in the context of the medieval milling industry in northern France, 1150–1250. Using Salop's spatial model, this article aims to show that political fragmentation increased investment in watermill construction because it reduced the capacity of rulers to limit competition from neighbouring mills. The calculations demonstrate that competition significantly reduced rulers' income from watermills and that the construction of more than 50 per cent of these mills cannot be economically ‘justified’ unless rulers' profit maximization over joint production is considered, and revenues from additional labour allocated to wheat production is included.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ehsrev:v:63:y:2010:i:3:p:664-687
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0013-0117
Access Statistics for this article
Economic History Review is currently edited by Stephen Broadberry
More articles in Economic History Review from Economic History Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().