Why it Pays to Conceal: On the Optimal Timing of Acquiring Verifiable Information

Eberhard Feess (), Michael Schieble and Markus Walzl

German Economic Review, 2011, vol. 12, issue 1, 100-123

Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-0475.2010.00506.x (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Journal Article: Why it Pays to Conceal: On the Optimal Timing of Acquiring Verifiable Information (2011)
Working Paper: Why it pays to conceal - on the optimal timing of acquiring verifiable information (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:germec:v:12:y:2011:i:1:p:100-123

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1465-6485

German Economic Review is currently edited by Bernhard Felderer, Joseph F. Francois, Ivo Welch, Urs Schweizer and David E. Wildasin

More articles in German Economic Review from Verein für Socialpolitik Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().