Why it pays to conceal - on the optimal timing of acquiring verifiable information

Eberhard Feess () and Markus Walzl

No 20, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR)

Date: 2006-01-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Why it Pays to Conceal: On the Optimal Timing of Acquiring Verifiable Information (2011)
Journal Article: Why it Pays to Conceal: On the Optimal Timing of Acquiring Verifiable Information (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umamet:2006020

DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2006020

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