When a Precedent of Donation Favors Defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma

Alexis Garapin, Daniel Llerena and Michel Hollard

German Economic Review, 2011, vol. 12, issue 4, 409-421

Date: 2011
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Journal Article: When a Precedent of Donation Favors Defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (2011)
Working Paper: When a Precedent of Donation Favors Defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma (2011)
Working Paper: When a precedent of donation favors defection in the Prisoner's dilemma (2010)
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