When a Precedent of Donation Favors Defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma

Alexis Garapin, Daniel Llerena () and Michel Hollard
Additional contact information
Daniel Llerena: GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique
Michel Hollard: GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: In this paper, the authors examine the question of whether a collective activity can influence cooperation in a subsequent repeated one-shot prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. They conduct two series of experiments. The first consists of control experiments in which 30 periods of a PD game are played, with a random rematching of the pairs in every period. In a second series of experiments, subjects first play a donation game (DG) and then the PD game. In the DG, they collectively discuss the amount of a donation to a given charity, before putting the question to an individual and anonymous vote. Cooperation levels in the PD games preceded by the DG are significantly lower than those observed in the control experiment.

Keywords: defection; repeated one-shot prisoner's dilemma; experiment; business and economics; donation; cooperation; economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-11
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in German Economic Review, 2011, 12 (4), pp.409 - 421. ⟨10.1111/j.1468-0475.2011.00532.x⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: When a Precedent of Donation Favors Defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma (2011)
Journal Article: When a Precedent of Donation Favors Defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (2011)
Working Paper: When a precedent of donation favors defection in the Prisoner's dilemma (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01809077

DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0475.2011.00532.x

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().