 Co‐evolution of Preferences and Information in Simple Games of TrustWerner Güth (), Hartmut Kliemt and Bezalel Peleg German Economic Review, 2000, vol. 1, issue 1, 83-110 Abstract: In standard rational choice modelling decisions are made according to given information and preferences. In the model presented here the `information technology' of individual decision‐makers as well as their preferences evolve in a dynamic process. In this process decisions are made rationally by players who differ in their informational as well as in their preference type. Relative success of alternative decisions feeds back on the type composition of the population which in turn influences rational decision‐making. An indirect evolutionary analysis of an elementary yet important basic game of trust shows that under certain parameter constellations the population dynamics of the evolutionary process specify a unique completely mixed rest point. However, as opposed to previous studies of preference formation in the game of trust there is no convergence to but only circumventing the rest point if the informational status of individuals evolves rather than being chosen strategically. Date: 2000 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:germec:v:1:y:2000:i:1:p:83-110 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article German Economic Review is currently edited by Bernhard Felderer, Joseph F. Francois, Ivo Welch, Urs Schweizer and David E. Wildasin More articles in German Economic Review from Verein für Socialpolitik Contact information at EDIRC. |
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