An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities

Tommy Andersson and Lars Ehlers

International Journal of Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 18, issue 1, 50-60

Abstract: We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy‐free and budget‐balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any profile of quasi‐linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy‐free rule can be obtained via so‐called agent‐ k‐linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent‐ k‐linked allocations.

Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12300

Related works:
Working Paper: An Algorithm for Identifying Least Manipulable Envy-Free and Budget-Balanced Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:18:y:2022:i:1:p:50-60

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1742-7355

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by Kazuo Nishimura and Makoto Yano

More articles in International Journal of Economic Theory from The International Society for Economic Theory
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().