An Algorithm for Identifying Least Manipulable Envy-Free and Budget-Balanced Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities

Tommy Andersson and Lars Ehlers

No 2021:2, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via so-called agent-k-linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations.

Keywords: Envy-freeness; Budget-balance; Least manipulable; Algorithm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D63 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2021-01-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic, nep-ore and nep-upt
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Related works:
Journal Article: An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2021_002

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