The Ghent effect for whom? Mapping the variations of the Ghent effect across different trade unions in Denmark

Laust Høgedahl

Industrial Relations Journal, 2014, vol. 45, issue 6, 469-485

Abstract: The presence of an unemployment insurance system based on voluntary membership in unemployment insurance funds (known as the ‘Ghent system’) and a high union density has long been known and well documented, and even referred to as a special ‘Ghent effect’. However the Ghent system, especially in the three classic Ghent countries, Finland, Sweden and Denmark, has come under significant pressure in recent years, and many researchers are referring to an erosion of the Ghent system as a recruiting mechanism for trade unions. But prior research aimed at documenting the Ghent effect seems to disregard variations in how strongly trade unions benefit from the Ghent system as a recruiting mechanism. Hence, this article sets out to investigate whether all trade unions equally benefit from a Ghent effect across different sectors and occupations by studying the Danish case. Unique survey data made it possible to map Danish wage earners' reasons for joining or leaving unemployment insurance funds and trade unions. The article finds that there are great variations among Danish trade unions in terms of how strongly they are dependent on a Ghent effect as a recruiting mechanism. We may expect the same variations in the two other Ghent countries, Sweden and Finland, because the organisation of the Ghent system is similar in the three Nordic countries. In addition, the article shows that this variation might help explain why some trade unions are on the rise to the detriment of others.

Date: 2014
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