The union default: Free‐riding solutions

Mark Harcourt, Gregor Gall and Margaret Wilson

Industrial Relations Journal, 2024, vol. 55, issue 4, 267-284

Abstract: A union default would empower unions to extend membership and representation to nonunion employers but still allow workers to opt‐out and, thereby, free‐ride. Though most workers would retain membership, free‐riding could still undermine a default. First, propensity to maintain membership is likely to vary, leaving some sectors with too few members for viable, effective representation. Second, public goods research suggests free‐riding increases over time when already extant. Third, expectations of widespread future free‐riding could discourage workers from recruiting the minimum number of workers necessary to attain the default. We test two solutions—all employees being required to pay union fees or employers paying union fees—to these challenges, examining effects on intention to retain membership and support for a default. We find both have positive impacts upon reducing free‐riding.

Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/irj.12426

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:indrel:v:55:y:2024:i:4:p:267-284

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0019-8692

Access Statistics for this article

Industrial Relations Journal is currently edited by Peter Nolan

More articles in Industrial Relations Journal from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().