How Do Organizational Environments and Mandatory Arbitration Shape Employment Attorney Case Selection? Evidence from an Experimental Vignette

Mark D. Gough

Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 2018, vol. 57, issue 4, 541-567

Abstract: Using a novel experimental vignette design, this study shows how firm adoption of equal employment opportunity (EEO) policies, internal dispute resolution procedures, occupational segregation, and use of mandatory arbitration agreements affect employment attorney perceptions of employment discrimination claims. Findings reveal the organizational environment of a claim can signal compliance with antidiscrimination law and the use of mandatory arbitration reduces the expected value of a claim and willingness to accept it for representation. These findings contribute to the understanding of antidiscrimination law as a social system by showing organizational environments and mandatory arbitration clauses predict attorney case assessment.

Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/irel.12217

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:indres:v:57:y:2018:i:4:p:541-567

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0019-8676

Access Statistics for this article

Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society is currently edited by Christopher (Kitt) Carpenter, Steven Raphael and stevenraphael@berkeley.edu

More articles in Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().