The geography of collective bargaining in French multi‐establishment companies

Philippe Askenazy and Clémentine Cottineau

Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 2025, vol. 64, issue 1, 125-144

Abstract: Despite growing interest in the firm bargaining process, little research focuses on the structure of bargaining within multi‐establishment firms. We question whether running negotiations at the workplace level and/or firm level is a strategic choice for employers. We hypothesize that the level chosen depends on the geography of the firm. Employers face a trade‐off: workplace bargaining is more efficient because it meets local conditions; yet higher level negotiations increase coordination costs for workers and weakens their bargaining power, which can benefit the employer. Using a French representative survey, we find a significant relation between the level of bargaining within a firm and the number, spatial distribution and heterogeneity of its establishments, suggesting that the structure of multi‐establishment firms can inform the level at which collective bargaining takes place.

Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:indres:v:64:y:2025:i:1:p:125-144

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