 A Remedy for the Executive Pay Problem: The Case for “Compensation Discussion and Analysis”Jeffrey N. Gordon Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 2005, vol. 17, issue 4, 24-35 Abstract: After acknowledging the strengths of Bebchuk and Fried's case for managerial power in setting executive pay, this article expresses three major reservations: First, concerns about the apparent lack of pay for performance do not alone provide a sufficient framework for understanding the controversy over CEO pay or devising a remedy. In fact, such concerns may well take a backseat to popular unrest about the levels of pay, a problem that Bebchuk and Fried largely ignore. Second, many of the compensation practices identified as “smoking guns” of managerial power, such as the failure to index stock and options and the use of “stealth compensation,” may have benign explanations. For example, since the vast majority of employee stock options are awarded to people well below the executive ranks, the absence of indexing may help to preserve a simple, visible score‐card (however flawed) for motivating all levels of the organization. And the use of stealth pay may be justified as a means of preventing public scrutiny from distorting private decisions. Third, even if corporate governance needs improvement, the best remedy may be not a wholesale expansion of shareholder power, but rather a tailored series of measures designed to bolster the defacto independence of the compensation committee. Most important, the SEC should require proxy disclosure of a “Compensation Discussion and Analysis” statement, signed by all the members of the compensation committee, that summarizes and justifies all compensation elements for all senior executives. The resulting process “ownership” and reputation‐staking will strengthen the committee's hand against managerial pressure. In addition, serious thought should be given to a shareholder approval vote on the CD&A following the new U.K. practice. Date: 2005 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jacrfn:v:17:y:2005:i:4:p:24-35 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Journal of Applied Corporate Finance is currently edited by Donald H. Chew Jr. More articles in Journal of Applied Corporate Finance from Morgan Stanley |
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