LABOUR MARKET DUALISM, THREAT OF EVICTION AND CROPSHARE TENANCY

Mohammad Taslim

Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1992, vol. 43, issue 1, 43-55

Abstract: Landlords in some countries commonly adopt a policy of short‐term leasing such that their tenants perpetually face a threat of termination of the contracts if their performance is not satisfactory. By explicitly modelling the threat of termination in a multi‐period framework, this paper demonstrates that: (a) a landlord may prefer a landed rather than a landless tenant, (b) although tenants are free to choose the amount of land for cropsharing, the marginal product of land is not driven down to zero, and (c) the efficiency of cropshare cultivation may not be ranked unambiguously against owner or wage cultivation.

Date: 1992
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