THE INTERNATIONAL LICENSING OF BRANDED FOOD PRODUCTS: A GAME‐THEORETIC ANALYSIS

Ian Sheldon and D. R. Henderson

Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1992, vol. 43, issue 3, 368-380

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to analyse the strategic motivation for food manufacturing firms to license their branded products to overseas firms. Using non‐cooperative game theory, product licensing is modelled in the context of a simple market‐entry game where licensing enters explicitly as a strategy that can be utilised by both a potential licensor and licensee. On the basis of this framework, possible licensing outcomes are derived that describe different motivations for food product licensing.

Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jageco:v:43:y:1992:i:3:p:368-380

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