Efficient Contract Design for Agri‐Environment Policy

Andrew Moxey, Ben White and Adam Ozanne

Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1999, vol. 50, issue 2, 187-202

Abstract: This paper evaluates alternative designs for contracts between a regulator and an agricultural producer to increase the supply of environmental public goods. Contract design, based on the principal‐agent model, takes into account an asymmetry of information between the regulator and producer whereby the regulator is unable to observe precisely the producer's compliance costs. An example is included of contracts designed for nitrate abatement.

Date: 1999
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-9552.1999.tb00807.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jageco:v:50:y:1999:i:2:p:187-202

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