On the Allocation of Possible EU Total Allowable Catches (TAC) for the Mediterranean Swordfish: An Envy-Free Criterion and Equitable Procedure
Athanasios Kampas ()
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2015, vol. 66, issue 1, 170-191
This paper examines the allocation of entitlement rights for the management of common property resources. In particular, the case of allocating a Total Allowable Catch quota for the Mediterranean swordfish is examined as a case study. The proposed approach comprises three steps. First, there is a bargaining procedure between the European Union (EU) and the rest of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) countries. As soon as an initial agreement is possible, the EU considers various equitable rationing methods to allocate its share to the European Member States. These rationing methods draw upon two different streams of the literature, bankruptcy and ‘burden sharing’. Finally, the European Member States reach a fair agreement through minimising an envy-free index. The allocation rule which is defined as the weighted average of equal proportion and equal share rationales represents the best compromise solution.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jageco:v:66:y:2015:i:1:p:170-191
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0021-857X
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Agricultural Economics is currently edited by David Harvey
More articles in Journal of Agricultural Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().