Opinion paper. The scientific premises of information science
Victor Rosenberg
Journal of the American Society for Information Science, 1974, vol. 25, issue 4, 263-269
Abstract:
Throughout my years of work as an information scientist I have been plagued by a personal and professional sense of doubt with respect to the field. A central theme of every conference that I have attended related to: “What is information science?” Or “Is information science a science?” In this paper I hope to take these questions head on. I must begin by saying that I do take information science seriously as a science. I see it as the quest for understanding of the nature of information and man's interaction with it. That we lack so much in this quest for understanding is the greatest challenge of the science. I intend to explore the tradition, or world view, bearing on the scientific study of information. The currently prevalent world view is the scientific tradition which extends from the Enlightenment to the present. I also intend to look critically at what I perceive to be the premises underlying most of our. current efforts to understand the phenomenon of information. The criticism will by necessity be speculative. I intend to stick my neck out, not because I can prove my assertions, but because I believe these ideas must be discussed.
Date: 1974
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jamest:v:25:y:1974:i:4:p:263-269
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