The Co‐operation Procedure in the EU: Why was the European Parliament Influential in the Decision on Car Emission Standards?

Claudia Hubschmid and Peter Moser

Journal of Common Market Studies, 1997, vol. 35, issue 2, 225-242

Abstract: The conditional influence of the European Parliament (EP) in the co‐operation procedure is a recognized empirical phenomenon in the literature. One explanation for such conditional influence is that the Parliament can successfully propose amendments only when the restriction which it faces changes during the decision‐making process. We explore this argument and find that it is able to explain the influence of the EP in the decision on car emission standards.

Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:35:y:1997:i:2:p:225-242

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