Coalition‐Sensitive Voting Power in the Council of Ministers: The Case of Eastern Enlargement

G. Michael Winkler

Journal of Common Market Studies, 1998, vol. 36, issue 3, 391-404

Abstract: The Shapley value is used to analyse the distribution of voting power for qualified majority decisions in the EU Council. Coalition‐neutral and coalition‐sensitive voting power are distinguished. In large unions such as the current Union of the Fifteen, the distribution of coalition‐neutral voting power almost coincides with the distribution of votes, whereas the coalition‐sensitive voting power of a Member State may deviate considerably from its share of votes and react strongly to small changes in circumstances. The case of eastern enlargement of the Union is used to demonstrate that coalition‐sensitive voting power appropriately exhibits the Member States’ influence in the Council.

Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00116

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:36:y:1998:i:3:p:391-404

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0021-9886

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Common Market Studies is currently edited by Jim Rollo and Daniel Wincott

More articles in Journal of Common Market Studies from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().