The 1992 CAP Reform, the Uruguay Round and the Commission: Conceptualizing Linked Policy Games

William D. Coleman and Stefan Tangermann

Journal of Common Market Studies, 1999, vol. 37, issue 3, 385-405

Abstract: Over the past decade, most OECD countries have begun to reform fundamentally their agricultural policies. Some dispute has emerged over the extent to which policy‐making at the international level has triggered and shaped these reforms. These disputes raise important theoretical questions about how we theorize and test for the degree of interdependence between international, European Union (EU), and domestic policy change. The concept of autonomous, linked games is offered as a possible theoretical route to follow, a route that also permits more systematic consideration of two possible roles of international organizations in policy‐making: international mediators and entrepreneurial leaders. Drawing on these concepts, reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is shown to be significantly shaped by proposals and outcomes in the international negotiations on agriculture during the GATT Uruguay Round, with the European Commission (EC) playing an entrepreneurial leader role.

Date: 1999
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