Harmful Tax Competition in the EU: Policy Narratives and Advocacy Coalitions

Claudio Radaelli

Journal of Common Market Studies, 1999, vol. 37, issue 4, 661-682

Abstract: This article investigates the dynamics of the European Union (EU) direct tax policy process by drawing attention to the political power of policy narratives in the context of the advocacy coalition framework. The narrative of harmful tax competition has been a political instrument for rekindling interest in a neglected policy area. Narratives do not operate in a political vacuum, however. Forum politics and the evolution of the policy environment have facilitated the emergence of harmful tax competition as main paradigm in EU direct tax policy. By representing itself not as a component of an advocacy coalition, but as a forum for intergovernmental deliberation, the Commission has curbed adversarial politics and created the preconditions for the adoption of tax proposals. The conclusions discuss the theoretical implications for the advocacy coalition framework.

Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:37:y:1999:i:4:p:661-682

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