The Politics of Codecision

Michael Shackleton

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2000, vol. 38, issue 2, 325-342

Abstract: Codecision has been central to the efforts and energy of the European Parliament throughout the 1990s. But to what effect? This article considers the extent and nature of the influence that the parliament had on legislation covered by the codecision provisions of the Maastricht Treaty (Art. 189B). It suggests that this influence can be explained in general terms, by the growth of shared norms between Council and Parliament, and in particular, by the specific characteristics of the distributive and regulatory policies covered by codecision. It concludes that the new Amsterdam provision (Art. 251) will reinforce the procedure as part of the acquis communautaire, but also open a broader debate about the role of the Parliament within the EU.

Date: 2000
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