 The End of Creeping Competence? EU Policy‐Making Since MaastrichtMark A. Pollack Journal of Common Market Studies, 2000, vol. 38, issue 3, 519-538 Abstract: From its origins in the Treaty of Rome to the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, the EU has expanded the range of its activities dramatically, adopting both budgetary and regulatory policies across a broad range of issue‐areas. The 1990s, however, witnessed a political and economic backlash against the creeping centralization of policy‐making in Brussels, threatening a major retrenchment, or even devolution, of EU policy‐making. This article examines budgetary and regulatory data from the late 1990s and early 2000s, to determine whether the centralization of policy‐making has slowed, or even reversed, during the post‐Maastricht era. The data reveal selective evidence of retrenchment in EU budgetary expenditures, which have been limited by the fiscal restrictions of EMU, German resistance to any increase in its net contribution, and the new budgetary demands of enlargement. By contrast, data on EU regulation suggest that the EU has been, and remains, an active regulator across a wide range of issue‐areas after Maastricht, and will continue to play the role of a regulatory state in the future. Date: 2000 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:38:y:2000:i:3:p:519-538 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Journal of Common Market Studies is currently edited by Jim Rollo and Daniel Wincott More articles in Journal of Common Market Studies from Wiley Blackwell |
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