The Anatomy of Autonomy: An Institutional Account of Variation in Supranational Influence

Jonas Tallberg

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2000, vol. 38, issue 5, 843-864

Abstract: This article presents a rational institutionalist account of why the Commission and the ECJ vary in their capacity to pursue successfully a supranational agenda. In the empirical part, the explanatory power of this approach is illustrated through a comparison of the Commission's and the ECJ's autonomy in the pursuit of a joint agenda in EU enforcement. The article suggests that the EU as a strategic context is comparatively more open to autonomous actions and supranational influence by the ECJ, which is subject to less intrusive control mechanisms and enjoys more accessible means of rule creation than the Commission.

Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:38:y:2000:i:5:p:843-864

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